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Abstract 
The objective of this program is to develop and apply a methodology for assessing the 
military value of indications and early warning (I&W) information, derived from external 
sources, on the mission effectiveness of a naval carrier battle group (CVBG). This would 
provide the basis for assessing the operational importance of the performance 
characteristics (timeliness, frequency of coverage, quality of information, etc.) of current 
or proposed information systems and to evaluate the consequences of enemy 
countermeasures on those systems. The need to account for operational decisions based on 
conflicting and incomplete information has led to the development of a unique wargame as 
a key element of the methodology. 
Introduction 
The value of indications and warning (I&W) information depends on how well it 
can be exploited. This in tum depends on two factors: first, the commander's interpretation 
and assessment of the information bearing on the employment decisions affecting his 
available forces. Second, the tactical outcome which is then determined by the relative 
engagement capabilities of the two sides. In seeking to improve the military outcome, there 
is clearly a tradeoff between enhancing the information available and improving the combat 
capability of the forces Hence a methodology for assessing the military value of 
surveillance and intelligence information must include simulations of combat capability to 
show how the outcomes of tactical engagements depend on the commander's tactical 
decisions in the use of his forces. 
I&W information flows to the fleet via a number of channels. However, one 
external I&W source is clearly set apart by having a significantly shorter average elapsed 
time between the collection of the basic data by a sensor and the receipt of the information 
by units at sea. This channel is known as the TRAP broadcast. Because of its time 
advantage, it is appropriate in developing the methodology to consider that all of the I& W 
flows in that channel. 
The TRAP information reaching the commander may be conflicting, incomplete, 
and confused by enemy interference and deception. The importance of accounting for the 
impact of these characteristics of the information on the commander's tactical decisions 
leads to a man-in-the-loop methodology, i.e. a specially designed wargame. When played 
by experienced commanders, the wargame makes explicit the dynamic interaction between 
required decisions and the availablity and interpretation of information. Insights on the 
commanders' use and interpretation of information under the time pressures of a tactical 
situation are enhanced by recording player discussions during the game. Detailed variability 
in the game results is to be expected due to the inevitable variability in decisions by 
different players. But this variability is also a fact of combat. The objective, then, is to 
determine what aspects of the information flow to the players produce major changes in the 
military outcome and can be expected to be effective in spite of the variability in player 
decisions. 
We have chosen to apply these general considerations by examining the impact of 
external source (nonorganic) information on the mission success of a naval carrier battle 
group (CVBG). The game scenario is an adaptation of a Middle-east contingency scenario 
developed by the Navy.(Ref 1) A multi-national naval force (without a carrier) is in the 
Persian Gulf. A complex war breaks out in the region committing alllitoral nation friendly 
air forces to national taskings. Iran tries to hold the multi-national force hostage by 
threatening to bar passage of the Straits of Hormuz. A U.S. CVBG is ordered to the Gulf 
of Oman to support the breakout of the hostage force by destroying Iranian SSM weapon 
sites around the Straits of Hormuz (while minimizing losses of aircraft and damage to the 
battle group). In carrying out the assigned offensive mission, the CVBG will be threatened 
and subject to attack by Iranian missile-carrying tactical aircraft. The geographical setting 
and a few hypothetical, but representative, SSM sites and airfields are shown in Fig. 1. 
This is the basic geographical display available to the players. It is this display which is 
used to portray the players' understanding of the disposition of enemy assets. The 
locations of the SSM sites are shown by icons in the shape of small missiles, while the 
















Fig.l. Geographic setting of scenario 
3 
The basis for assessing the offensive and defensive success of the battle group will 
be timeliness in destroying the SSM sites, limitation of damage to surface components of 
the battle group by enemy air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and the losses of friendly aircraft 
as compared with enemy aircraft. These results will be evaluated in real time by the combat 
engagement models (representing expected levels of engagement capabilities) integrated in 
the game and will depend directly on the tactical decisions made by the commanders. These 
models must portray the engagement capabilities of both sides in much the same terms used 
in the study of hardware requirements, and the results of each engagement must be 
incorporated into the game in real time so losses on both sides will have their appropriate 
consequences in subsequent engagements. The central issue is to assess the contribution of 
the nonorganic information received via the TRAP broadcast to the offensive and defensive 
effectiveness of the battle group. 
The information flowing to the players includes electronic intercepts from mission 
targets and enemy air defense elements, indications of potentially threatening enemy aircraft 
movements, IR intercepts and imagery results. The operational decisions on the use of 
carrier aircraft will be more or less effective depending on the quality, frequency, and 
timeliness of the information, and the interpretation and integration of the information by 
the players. The game also provides a framework for assessing the impact of proposed 
additions to the I&W information from new systems. 
The players in the game represent the CVBG commander and the senior staff. The 
information flow is treated as a controlled variable so that it can be varied between games to 
represent changes in sensor capability or the consequences of enemy actions. While the 
goal is to have a methodology that is useful for assessing the value of information systems, 
the same methodology can be used to compare the gain in military effectiveness provided 
by new information systems to the gain in effectiveness provided by an improvement in 
combat capability due to the introduction of new weapon systems and tactics. 
The lnfonnation Flow 
In any study evaluating the military utility of capabilities or equipments, the 
scenario is a crucial feature. The scenario developed for this game has been described in 
general terms in the Introduction. Following are the specific aspects of the scenario that are 
converted to information in the wargame: 
4 
a) The characterization of the fixed and mobile elements of the enemy force, such as 
their geographical location, and on-off operational cycles, provides the data needed to 
determine the exposure to intercept of emissions by overhead systems. Figure 2 is a 
representative page from the scenario. It shows movements by units that comprise both 
complete targets and only portions of the assets originally comprising a target. The 
movements can begin and end both before and after the commencement of play; the times 
are specified to the nearest half-day; and the precise times are generated within the 
simulations. Of course, if a contact is received from a mobile system at its new location, 
the players will not be provided information about where the system relocated from or if it 
had simply been shut down previously. The intelligence picture will continue to show the 
mobile system at its old location, unless the players decide that something has changed and 
take it off the display. 
b) A detailed specification of enemy air movements as part of the scenario serves as 
the basis for the generation of air movement TRAP messages as weJJ as defining the 
ground truth aircraft tracks for the computer. Figure 3 lists three examples of typical enemy 
air movements in preparation for and during the conduct of an attack on the CVBG. The 
reconnaissance track is given as a series of way-points and times. It could also be given in 
the form of way-points and average flight speeds. The forward deployment shows the 
movement of aircraft from home to staging base in preparation for an attack on the CVBG. 
The attack is shown as the movement of raiding aircraft from a staging base to a "push 
point". From the "push point", the computer generates a radial course to the CVBG, 
wherever the players position it within the scenario-constrained operating area. Data from 
the Gulf war are used to determine the degree to which these movements might be reported 
by TRAP messages.(Ref. 2) 
The players begin the game with initial inteJJigence on enemy resources: the location 
of enemy SAM and SSM sites, airfields, numbers and locations of enemy aircraft, 
command centers, etc. As the game develops, the bulk of the information on enemy 
movements and activities wiJJ be information gathered by systems nonorganic to the battle 
group and promptly transmitted to the battle group by the TRAP broadcast. However, the 
players can, if they wish, send out reconnaissance missions to gain inteJJigence on enemy 
threat systems, but this takes time and must be weighed against the urgency of 
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a. A Reconn11iss:mcc Mission 
Two Flt1, Esfnlwn 1mscd Tomcnls, TNs Flt1321 nnd Flt1J22, CS Clmh Six, Northern 
Arnhifln Sen CVBO Reece. 














I I I 6JJ nn<l Terminnle 
Three Ml<127, Omidiyeh hnscd Floggers (two ASM and one escort jammer). TNs 
M2720 I, M27202 and M272 I 2, moving from Omidiych to Clwh Bahr. 
Dcp. 30-SON/49-JJE I 20t1007. 
25-27N/60-2JE 12053(} nnd remain UFN 
c. An /\IInck on the CVBO 
lrnnshahr compmile Alh•ck Mission consisting nr Five MI029 (Shirn7. hnsed Fulcrums, 
TNs M29055/56/58/59/6 I and Escort Jammer M29065), nnd Four MIG27 (Omidiych 
based ASM-configmcd Floggers, TNs M272 I 4-17 and Escort Jammer M272 I 8). CS is 
tnmslmhr 23. Altitudes nrc: for MIG 29, 25 kO; f(lr Jnnuners, I 5 kn~ nnd MIO 27, <1000 
n. 
Dcp. translu•hr ,27-11 N/60-42E 
25-00N/61-00E 
Legend: TN,..,. tnil rmmhers, CS =call sign 
120900Z 
120920, This is "push point" for 
nllnck on the CVBO. 
Fig.3. Typical air-movement scenario events 
7 
may be contained in pilot reports from offensive actions, but the TRAP broadcast will 
remain the predominant source of vital information on enemy developments. 
TRAP messages representing expected overhead contacts are generated by a 
simulator developed by the Navy's Operational Support Office. Information from service 
and theater systems may also be part of the message stream where the availability of such 
systems is consistent with the scenario. All of these messages will concern matters of vital 
interest to the players in deciding on offensive and defensive actions 
The game is designed to show the military consequences of player decisions based 
on their perceptions of enemy activities, rather than on the scenario's "ground truth". The 
players cannot necessarily assume that the information they receive by TRAP is valid. It is 
recognized that in various ways the information collected is subject to interference or 
deception by the enemy. Thus an information flow for a game can be developed that 
incorporates such enemy actions and the impact of this "interference" on the evolution of 
the players' perceived intelligence picture and the military consequences can be evaluated. 
The fusion of nonorganic and organic information is not an automatic process since it 
depends on the players' assessment of the credibility of the TRAP messages. This 
methodology then provides a way to assess how much interference and deception by the 
enemy causes the TRAP messages to be ignored or downgraded in importance, which 
could then be the basis for system modifications designed to limit the consequences of 
possible enemy interference and deception. 
The format of the TRAP messages for overhead contacts is shown in Figure 4. The 
message indicates the time of contact, the geographical location, the location-error ellipse, 
and the type of system detected. The top line in the message is for bookkeeping by the 
game computer and is not part of the message received by the players. Each enemy emitting 
system that is part of the scenario is given a P number and its correct location is specified. 
The message received by the players can only be identified by them by a message number 
which is chronologically determined. The emitter location given in the message will differ 
from the true location to reflect the lack of precision in locating emitters by electronic 
contacts. 
The players use the geographical display for their area of operations to show their 
perception of the supposed location of potential enemy targets, defense systems and 
8 
TRAP MSG 0806- 12MAR93 Pl37 27-12N 54-19E 
EXERIEXERCISE MESSAGE// 
MSGID/T ACELINT/120806Z// 
SOli -/120740Z/ -/ALT COMMAND CENTER!/ 
EMLOC/-IE/ILS:271255N541929E/-/126.9T/29.0NM/5.3NM// 
NARRIMOBILE SURFACE SEARCH, ACQUISITION & TRACKING RADAR 
DECLIOADR// 
END TRAP MSG 
- -
TRAP MSG 2334- 12MAR93 P204 25-43N 57-47E 
EXERIEXERCISE MESSAGE 
MSGIDITACELINT/122334Z 
SOII-/122257Z/ -/MILITARY COMMAND CENTER// 
EMLOC/ -IE/ LS:254317N57473E/ -/200.1T/31.8NM/20.4NM// 
NARR/METEOROLOGICAL SOUNDINGS// 
DECLIOADR// 
END TRAP MSG 
- -
TRAP MSG 0842- 12MAR93 P205 25-38N 57-47E 
EXERIEXERCISE MESSAGE 
MSG ID/T ACELINT/1 20842ZJ/ 
SOI/-/120817Z/-/COMBINED SSM BATTERY & CONTROL CENTER!/ 
EMLOC/- /FJLS:25382 J N574730Fl -/329.2T/47.6NM/J 7. J NM// 
NARRIPRECISION SURFACE SEARCH RADAR// 
DECLIOADR// 
END TRAP MSG 
- -
Fig. 4 Sample TRAP Messages for Overhead Contacts 
9 
activity as well as the location of the battle group and its airborne defense elements (CAP 
aircraft, E2Cs). When a TRAP message is received, a flashing symbol identifying the 
emitting system appears on the display at the location given in the message. If the icon is 
"pucked", the TRAP message will appear on the screen. Fig. 5 shows such a message 
resulting from an intercept of an emitter at a surface-to-air-missile (SAM) site. The location 
is given by an icon, a capped-missile symbol, and the message is clearly linked to it. The 
players can decide to "accept" the data , which stops the flashing and leaves the system 
symbol on the display. If they wish to disregard the new data, the symbol can be removed 
from the display. If the symbol is retained, the TRAP message will be kept in a file and can 
be recovered at any time by the players for further consideration. Figure 6 shows a 
representative TRAP message for air activity. The locating icon is a Naval Tactical Data 
System (NTDS) aircraft symbol capped by the abbreviation"INTEL". The message is 
similar to the other classes of TRAP messages with the addition of fields for altitude, 
course and speed (when available) and an indication of whether the report is one of a series 
on the same aircraft, which could lead to the establishment of a track. 
At the start of the game, the display shows the deployment of enemy radars, 
missile systems, etc, as specified by prior intelligence. It is assumed that this intelligence 
picture has been developed over a period of time from many intelligence sources so that it 
provides accurate location of enemy systems. As the game proceeds the supposed 
disposition of enemy forces is altered by the incoming TRAP messages, provided the 
players consider them credible. (At the same time, "ground truth" as determined by the 
evolutions detailed in the scenario is displayed for observers at a separate monitor station.) 
The greater the difference between "ground truth" and the players' perception of ground 
truth, the less effective the carrier force will be in carrying out its offensive missions and in 
defending itself. 
General Game Design 
The objective of the wargame design has been to generate a "realistic" decision 
environment for the experiments. The choice of the scenario avoids the introduction of 
factors that would blur the direct linkage of information-available to tactical decisions-
made. In the early days of the depicted crisis, the CVBG commander is the joint task force 
commander. This gives the players a freer hand in offensive decisions. At some cost in 
realism and , after being assigned the overall offensive objective,. the players are granted 
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their own selection, without referring these selections to theater or national authorities for 
approval. All of the action in the game is related to the employment of air assets and 
missiles by the two sides. The possible use of submarines by the "enemy" or amphibious 
landings by friendly forces is ruled out by the scenario. 
The game is basically a one sided action, in that the location and movement of 
enemy assets as well as the detailed structure and timing of enemy air attacks on the CVBG 
are pre-scripted. However, the players' actions can modify the pre-scripted movement of 
enemy forces in two ways that are important to the objectives of these experiments. First, 
ground truth is altered on the basis of the results obtained in CVBG offensive strikes. The 
CVBG commander will credit strike results from air crew reports on the premise that aim 
points attacked are aim points destroyed; this is an assumption that can differ significantly 
from the true results. Second, if a target has been destroyed according to ground truth, 
then no additional TRAP messages of contacts from that particular target will be received 
by the players. Finally, the players may decide to execute strikes on enemy airfields for the 
purpose of reducing the enemy air threat to the CVBG. They have to balance such actions 
against early execution of the offensive tasks they have been assigned. Whether such 
actions appear, on balance, desirable will depend on the players' intelligence picture. If 
aim points are destroyed at enemy airfields, the weight of the pre-scripted enemy air attacks 
on the CVBG will be reduced in proportion to reflect a reduced operational capability at the 
enemy airfields. Thus these changes in the pre-scripted forces and actions of the enemy are 
brought about by the actions of the players in carrying out their mission. Otherwise, it is 
essential to keep the threat to the battle group constant from one play of the game to the 
next while the externally supplied information to the players is varied. 
Given the choice of gaming as the basic technique, the next step was to settle on the 
functions and activities to be portrayed in the game and the level of detail with which each 
one should be simulated. A major concern was the level of detail to be used for the 
simulation of defensive engagements. The structure and timing of enemy attacks on the 
fleet are pre-scripted in the scenario. The players make decisions on the disposition of their 
defensive forces as the game proceeds and decisions on initial defensive responses as a 
feint or attack develops. These tactical decisions are directly influenced by their 
interpretation of the I&W information that has been received. Once these decisions have 
been made and forces committed in execution, the engagement simulation takes over and 
estimates their success in countering the attacking aircraft and the enemy's success in 
13 
launching missiles against and damaging elements of the battle group. In this way, the 
military value of the I& W information is assessed in real time in the game. The assignment 
of unit capabilities in the types of engagements that are encompassed in the simulation are 
based on the Navy's estimates of those capabilities. The interplay of information and 
weapon system capabilities is evident. Defensive engagements will be discussed in more 
· detail later. 
The simulation of the military consequence of offensive decisions was more 
straightforward. I&W information directly affects offensive decisions in two ways. The 
mission of the CVBG is to provide air cover and strike support for the escorted merchant 
ship convoy while that group exits the Gulf; suppression of surface-to-surface missiles 
threatening that movement is integral to the basic mission. The SSM sites are mobile and 
transportable introducing an increasing threat to the exiting convoy as new sites are 
activated. I& W information is crucial in establishing the presence and location of these sites 
about the Straits of Hormuz. Secondly, knowledge of enemy defensive elements, such as 
warning radars, SAM sites and interceptor aircraft, has a direct influence on offensive 
planning for the composition and size of the needed strike force. Availability of aircraft is a 
major constraint in this scenario. The greater the disparity between "ground truth" and the 
players' intelligence picture, the Jess effective the battle group will be in carrying out its 
offensive mission. As will be described later, elements of the Pacific Fleet Headquarter's 
THOR model have been adapted to the development of a Strike Operations Model which is 
used during offensive planning and and to simulate strike results against ground truth. 
The game also provides for the receipt of scenario background information by the 
players in the form of various types of messages. These messages largely concern friendly 
and enemy activity in the Gulf beyond the immediate field of CVBG activity. Some of this 
information, such as the progress of the naval force out of the Gulf, is of direct importance 
to the timing of the players' decisions. The message flows are also an important 
contribution to the "reality" of the wargame, but must be limited to avoid overloading the 
players who in the real world would be supported by large staffs. Messages are therefore 
filtered and summarized in the form that reaches the players, because the intent is to show 
the impact of the information on decisions not to test the powers of the players to resist 
saturation. 
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Finally, for the intitial application of this methodology, the game will cover the last 
four hours of daylight on one day of combat and eight hours of the next, although the 
scenario for a more extended game has been developed. The first four hours will have a 
low tempo of activity to train the players in the use of the gaming equipment. The play of 
the second day will constitute the application of the methodology. There will be either three 
or four players in a game, and all will have had command-related experience in a carrier 
battle group. The wargame is designed to be played in the Naval Postgraduate School 
Secure Computing and Simulation Laboratory which is equipped with VAX computers and 
the necessary display equipment. Further details of the game support software and the 
physical arrangements in the laboratory are given later. 
The Commander's Tactical Decisions 
The tactical decisions made by the commander (the players) will determine the 
favorable or unfavorable conditions of the ensuing offensive and defensive engagements. 
But the players do not "fight" the detailed engagements. Simulations that incorporate 
estimated weapon system capabilities make calculations of the engagement outcomes 
resulting from the players decisions on the disposition of their forces and report the results 
to the players at the appropriate times. In offensive operations there will be reports of 
aim points destroyed, aircraft lost, targets not found, etc. Enemy and friendly ground truth 
in the game will be updated automaticaJly (but not reported to the players, unless subject to 
observation by organic or nonorganic systems). In the case of AA W operations, any 
damage to the CVBG from air launched missiles will be reported, as well as aircraft lost. If 
the carrier is damaged, the damage will be reflected in a reduced capability for air 
operations. If AA W -capable surface ships are damaged, there is a corresponding reduction 
of the capability in the "inner" air battle (the missile defenses) which is incorporated in the 
simulation of the AA Wresults. (Appendix C) 
Decisions made by the players influenced by the information in the TRAP broadcast 
include the following: 
*Allocating fighters to defensive AA W operations (vice allocating fighters to 
support offensive operations) and setting the alert posture of the defending fighters. 
*Planning reconnaissance and strike missioons to satisfy the tasking orders. 
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*Specifying aircraft to be employed in offensive strikes designed either to decrease 
the perceived threat to the carrier force or to carry out the assigned missions 
*Positioning and timing the launch of airborne AA W assets, inducting the E2Cs 
and fighters. These decisions will depend on the players' belief as to the direction, 
weight, and timing of an enemy air attack 
The players will be expected to follow current tactical doctrine in the use of their 
forces. For offensive strikes, this tactical doctrine is incorporated in a Strike Operations 
Model which directly affects strike planning and the effectiveness of strike 
execution.(Appendix A) Doctrine for MRAA W near the land in a contingency operation 
has been undergoing intensive development during the past few years.(Ref. 3) Based on 
that effort, we are assuming that in a contingency operation the principal threat to the 
CVBG will be represented by low flying attack aircraft, carrying air-to-surface missiles, 
supported by escort fighters and stand-off and escort jammers. The players will be briefed 
on the initial defensive posture at the beginning of the one-half day familiarization session. 
Subsequent postures and the actions to be taken if an enemy attack is imminent, or in 
response to enemy jamming, are left to the players and are dependent on any I&Wavailable 
on the timing and structure of the attacks and feints. The simulations used to determine the 
outcome of offensive and defensive engagements resulting from the player decisions will 
be discussed in the following two sections. 
An important objective in developing the game has been to provide a game 
environment that is realistic as far as information flow into the command center is 
concerned so that the players can feel that they are addressing a military problem. The game 
will be run in real time so that the dynamic factors will be properly represented. As in the 
real world, the players will be under time pressures to carry out their assigned missions. 
Simulation of Offensive Engagements 
The PACFLT THOR simulation (Ref. 4) served as the basis for the Strike 
Operations Model incorporated into the game. This model is used separately to assist 
players in strike planning and for determining the results of the execution of a strike. In 
strike planning, the model in effect substitutes for the normal staff support in sizing the 
strike force to attack selected targets, recommending aircraft/ordnance combinations for 
each aim point and allocating sorties to the several roles within the strike package. 
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The effectiveness of each platform or weapon system that plays a role in the strike 
is specified in a data table. Each target, identified by a P number, is divided into a number 
of "aimpoints". Each aim point is assigned to a vulnerability category depending on its 
general characteristics, i.e. SAM launcher, ammunition bunker, etc. These vulnerability 
categories provide the data needed for determination, by the Strike Operations Model, of 
the weapon loads and number of strike aircraft for offensive actions against the selected 
targets. 
The data table represents the current Navy estimates of system capabilities. 
Improvements in capabilities would be reflected in changes of the values in the data table. 
The Strike Operations Model also incorporates the recommended tactics, in accord with 
Navy doctrine, to be employed by the strike package. Figure 7 shows, using notional 
entries, the display from which the desired damage to the selected targets can be specified 
in planning the strike. The "Plan Attack" column controls the player actions. The "Full 
Target List" window shows the current status of each possible target. Aircraft availability 
for assignment to a strike and the assignments made are shown in the "Attack Aircraft 
Allocation" window. Using the players' intelligence picture as it has evolved up to that 
point, the model also calculates a recommended strike package. The model's 
recommendations are shown and compared with the players' tentative assignments in 
"Plan Result Messages" window. The desired aircraft may not be available at that time and 
the strike may have to be replanned, accepting lower expected damage to the targets, a 
larger number of less efficient sorties, reduced defense neutralization, or a reduction in the 
number of targets to be attacked. 
While the strike planning is done on the basis of the players' perception of the state 
of the enemy forces; the execution of the strike by the model is carried out using "ground 
truth" for the state of the enemy forces and is the basis for determining the aim points 
destroyed and the strike aircraft losses. Only the aircraft losses are reported to the CVBG 
commander. As discussed previously, the commander in the game will proceed on the 
assumption tthat all of the aimpoints attacked are destroyed Offensive actions may be 
directed at some target that in fact has moved and is not at the expected location. The 
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Fig. 7. Display for planning strike operations 
players. Despite the time delays incurred, the players may decide to send out a 
reconnaissance mission in a particular area before planning a strike. The reconnaissance 
report received by the players will be based on "ground truth". 
A separate model (Ref. 5) developed by the Center for Naval Analyses is used to 
determine the availability of CVBG aircraft at any time taking account of expected rates of 
equipment failure, time for maintenance, aircraft on other missions and aircraft previously 
lost in prior engagements. 
Figure 8 compares the strike results as given by the Strike Operations Model for 
strike packages based on different player perceptions of the state of enemy air defenses. In 
this example, the targets are two airfields with four aimpoints each. According to ground 
truth, the enemy has 9 interceptors in the area that could intercept a raid as well as three 
operational SAM sites and local AAA. Based on the vulnerability numbers for the selected 
aim points, the attack objectives can be met by using 8 strike aircraft, one for each 
aimpoint. Four strike packages have been designed depending on the players' perceptions 
ofthestateofthe enemy defenses ranging from an accurate view of "ground truth" to the 
extreme misperception that there are no enemy air defenses to be encountered. The strike 
planning model called for 11 support aircraft against "ground truth" defenses but none in 
the extreme case when the players erroneously believed that there were no enemy air 
defenses. The table shows the resulting wide variation in the number of aimpoints 
destroyed as well as the penalty in blue aircraft lost for incorrectly characterizing the enemy 
defenses. The players could have sent support aircraft "as insurance" even if their 
intelligence indicated an absence of enemy defenses, but that would limit the aircraft 
available for AA Wand so would not be penalty free. 
Simulation of Anti-Air Warfare Engagements 
Scenario development includes plans for air attacks and feints against the battle 
group at predetermined times so that with one exception, enemy attacks will not vary from 
game play to game play. Carrier strikes on enemy airfields can reduce the weight of the 
planned enemy air attacks. On the basis of aim points destroyed according to the execution 
of the strike simulation, the expected operational capability of the enemy airfields will be 
reduced. The designation of strikes for the purpose of reducing the air threat to the carrier 
group is one of the tactical decisions available to the players. 
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SI~NSITIVITY TESTING OF GAMING SYSTI~I\1 
STRIKE OPERATIONS 
Targets: Two airfields with four aimpoints each, plus defenses consisting of nine 
effective interceptors, three SAM sites and local AAA. 
Table or Strike Results 
as a Function or Players' Perceptions or Defenses 
Eight Strike Aircrafi; Support Aircrafi Variable, II max. 
Strike ltesults 
Number of Support Aim points 
l,layer Perceptions Aircraft Dcstro)·ed 
Full l>denses I I 6 
(i.e. ground truth) 
tlndcrcstimated SAM 8 4.5 * 
sites 
No lntercc1Jtors, Full 6 2 
SAMs 
No Defenses 0 0 
• This value is the average of two sub-cases 
Fig. 8 Sensitivity of Strike Results to I& W 
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As noted previously, the principal threat to the CVBG is represented by low flying 
aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles. Normally the AA W ships in the CVBG will be 
deployed between the carrier and the coast. Consequently, the AA W ships are the most 
exposed to air attack. The first part of the AA W engagement evaluation will be to determine 
how many of the attack aircraft were intercepted by defensive fighters before they reached 
missile launch boundaries against the AA W ships. The simulation will then estimate the 
losses on both sides. Since the available battle space is limited, defensive fighters need to 
be in the right place at the right time. The two principal methods for acquiring low flying 
aircraft are represented in the game. If the attack aircraft fly out of the stand-off jamming 
coverage, the E2C will make the detection and the players can then direct some of the 
availabledefensiveaircraft for an intercept. Alternatively, defensive aircraft can be sent to 
search particular sectors at low altitude. Detection and successful engagement is more 
difficult in this case. Success probabilities obtained in recent fleet exercises will be applied 
to the game evaluation. 
The enemy can send any combination of medium and low altitude aircraft, 
including escort jammers, escort fighters, and ASM-carrying attack aircraft that he 
chooses. In general, escorts would tend to be at medium altitude, with the objective of 
keeping defending aircraft away from the attack aircraft. The script could call for the attack 
aircraft to penetrate the CVBG defenses in company with the escorts, or relying on 
deception, to penetrate alone to attempt an undetected approach until they have to pop-up 
for the required weapons launch maneuvers. Only a few low flying (1000 ft altitude) 
attacking aircraft will be detected and engaged by CVBG surface ship SAM systems 
assuming a 35 nmi pop-up stand-off launch range. During the development of the attack, 
the players will receive reports of escort aircraft at medium altitudes that are detected by 
surface ships. However, escort jammers accompanying the enemy fighters could limit the 
ability of the surface ships to determine the course of the raid. 
In the scenario situation, a large attack might consist of a total of 16 aircraft: 
standoff jammers at different azimuths, an escort jammer, eight escorts, and six attack 
aircraft. The aircraft in such an attack would typically penetrate on one or two axes with the 
group on one axis possibly being a feint. All aircraft participating in the feint or raid 
penetrations which survive the CVBG defenses are assumed to return to their staging bases 
after they reach a pre-specified ASM launch range from the center of the battle group 
formation. 
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At least one E2C will be kept airborne at all times while the CVBG is operating in a 
littoral region under the postulated scenario. Defensive fighters can be positioned in CAP 
stations at varying strength or in various stages of deck alert. Fig. 9 shows a hypothetical 
defensive deployment consisting of two CAP stations and an airborne E2C. The locations 
of the CAP stations are indicated by icons consisting of the capped letter "s". Additionally, 
the range and bearing of each station from the carrier, and the number of fighters on-station 
are shown. (In the example, the stations are unoccupied.) The E2C location is indicated by 
a dot centered in a semi-circle. Around the E2C is diagrammed its nominal detection range 
against medium-altitude tactical aircraft, with a notch showing the impact of stand-off 
jamming on the detection capability. 
It is anticipated that the attacks against the battle group will begin with stand-off 
jamming of any E2Cs that are airborne. The players will then follow the recently developed 
Medium Range AAW (MRAAW) doctrine, taking account of the state of their knowledge 
of the enemy's attack structure from I&W received via the TRAP broadcast. Actions may 
include sending fighters along a strobe to obtain a raid count, launching aircraft into a 
"sponge", or sending aircraft to search for enemy attack aircraft. The MRAA W doctrine is 
applied by the players in real time as influenced by the state of their I&W, so that their 
actions immediately impact on the engagement outcome. As described previously , the 
recommended tactics for offensive operations are incorporated in the Strike Operations 
Model and I&W influences the results then by its impact on the players' perception of 
ground truth and, hence, on the selected composition of the strike package. 
A key factor influencing the success of the defense will be the ongoing airborne 
defense posture and the aircraft alert status on the carrier. Aircraft availability may be low 
because of battle damage or because too many aircraft were sent in support of offensive 
strikes leaving the resulting airborne and alert posture weak and poorly positioned as a 
consequence of inadequate I&W. The game-support software tracks the status of each 
aircraft moving them with realistic delays, through maintenance and the various states of 
alert in response to player commands and reports the aircraft status in a continuously 
updated display. Fig. 10 shows the numbers of aircraft in each of the stages of alert as well 
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Fig.IO Aircraft alert status display 
Figure 11 shows an example of the sensitivity of AA W success to the alert status 
of the carrier aircraft for an enemy attack coming from an unexpected azimuth at an 
unexpected time against the CVBG operating 160 nautical miles from shore. In this case, 
the attack consists of escort fighters and low altitude attack aircraft on two axes 45 degrees 
apart, supported by escort and stand-off jamming. The failure to predict the direction of the 
attack leaves some of the airborne CAP in an unfavorable position to counter the attack. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen from Fig. 11, a robust defense can still be maintained if the 
alert status allows 8 fighters to be launched from the carrier within 15 minutes of initial 
detection of the jamming strobes. The procedures used to evaluate of the outcomes of the 
air battles including possible damage to the surface ships is discussed in Appendices B and 
c. 
Wargame Implementation 
The new combat analysis and game support system that has been developed is 
called GRASS (Gaming Research and Analysis System). In developing GRASS, wherever 
feasible, segments of existing software packages from other wargames have been adapted. 
For example, the widely used Navy simulation and game support system known as RESA 
(Ref. 6)is the underlying source of the timing mechanism, the algorithms for kinetic 
calculationsofplatform movements and intercepts, the geographic display drivers and the 
file structure for keeping the records of game activity. The control of the flow of the 
background message traffic is accomplished with a modified (and simplified) version of 
EPISODE, a communications simulation developed for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) (Ref. 7). Finally the representation of carrier strike 
operations is, as noted earlier, supported by a program making extensive use of the design 
and algorithms of the THOR simulation. 
It was necessary to develop many new features for GRASS in order to meet the 
special requirements of this project. The simulation of the receipt and handling of the 
TRAP messages (as previously described) required new software. The ability to present a 
scripted, hence controlled, flow of messages, coupled with the players' ability selectively 
to accept items of information for incorporation into their intelligence picture is a key to the 
utility of the game. The splitting of THOR, a closed simulation, into two parts based 
respectivelyon ground truth and the players' perception of ground truth has already been 
discussed. The first portion is used, as in the original version, to evaluate the outcomes of 
sending variously configured strikes against chosen targets. The new portion is used by the 
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SENSITIVITY TESTING OF GAMING SYSTEM 
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
PLAYER INTERCEPTORS PENETRATORS 
PERCEPTIONS ENGAGED KILLED 
ATTACK IMMINENT, 14 ESCORTS - ALL 
THREAT AXIS RIGHT ATTACKERS- 50% 
ATTACK NOT LIKELY, 8 ESCORTS- 50% 
Til REA T AXIS \VRONG AlTACKERS- 20% 
Fig. 11 Sensitivity of AA W Results to Alert Status 
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players to plan their offensive strikes but is based on the players' Intelligence picture 
(displayed on the GRASS Graphical Display) derived from the externally generated 
information flow. As mentioned above, an AA W evaluation model has been developed to 
determine the engagement outcomes resulting from the player's operational decisions. In 
developing the model, extensive use has been made of the results of simulations of 
MRAA Win the Naval Weapons Center WEPT AC simulator (Ref. 8) as well as the results 
of fleet exercises (Ref. 9). The percentage of ASMs, successfully launched, that hit a ship 
target and the consequent loss of operational capability resulting from ship damage is based 
on estimates of the effectiveness of ship point defenses and ship vulnerability 
(Appendix C). 
An importantfeatureofGRASS is the ability to have mobile assets (e.g. SAM and 
SSM systems, radars, and air defense command centers) as part of the target list. The 
presence of a target is made known to the players either through TRAP messages or a 
reconnaissance mission. GRASS generates negative reports when it evaluates strike 
missions. A negative intelligence report says, "I went to location X expecting to encounter 
a SAM site, but no detections were made". This information may then be used to modify 
the players' intelligence perception but does not alter ground truth. 
The wargame is designed to be played in the Secure Computing Simulation 
Laboratory of the Naval Postgraduate School, which is equipped with VAX computers and 
the necessary displays and other ancillary equipment. The players will work with four 
terminals. The GRASS Message terminal is used to receive background messages 
providing information on developments outside of the CVBG immediate field of interest as 
well as messages from higher headquarters providing orders and guidance for the players. 
The GRASS Graphical display (on both monitors and a large screen)is a color 
situation display on which organic information (i.e. CAP and E2C stations, detections of 
enemy aircraft by airborne and surface radars and jamming strobes) is displayed along with 
the players' intelligence on the locations of potential enemy targets and threats. The players 
have the ability to remove any undesired information from the display. 
The GRASS Order terlninal is operated by a computer-support person and is used 
for executing the players' commands in the game. Orders to change the position of the 
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CVBG, allocate aircraft between offensive and defensive missions, fly missions, and place 
aircraft in alert status are all accomplished from this terminal. 
Finally a terminal is available to the players for planning strike missions with the 
StrikeOperationsModel. An aircraft availability and alert status display is also available at 
this terminal. In a separate location, ground truth showing enemy targets and aircraft 
movements together with the position of friendly forces is presented on a graphical 
display. This makes it possible for observers to keep track of the development of the 
scenario and the game. 
An audio system is used for recording discussions that take place between the 
players during the game. These discussions provide insights on how the external 
information was interpreted and to what degree this information affected the operational 
decisions made during the game. The oral record should be of particular importance where 
the TRAP message flow reflects the consequences of enemy countermeasures, including 
interference and deception. 
Concluding Remarks 
This methodology provides a framework for examining such questions as the 
required characteristics of new I&W systems, the balance in resources to be allocated to 
improvements in C4II versus improvements in combat capability,and the potential impact 
on mission success of enemy actions to degrade the externally provided information. The 
key to answering these questions is an assessment of the value of information in a tactical 
scenario. The information flow is the controlled "experimental variable" and the military 
consequences of the commanders' tactical decisions are directly evaluated by offensive and 
defensive engagement models. 
Externally supplied information may compensate in part for limitations in defensive 
capability that are inherent in the compressed battle space of contingency scenarios or the 
information may enhance the ability of the battle group to achieve local air control. With 
this methodology, the degree to which expanded intelligence on the disposition and 
movements of enemy air forces have the potential for changing the local military balance 
can be assessed in the context where the expected combat effectiveness of the CVBG is an 
integral part of the assessment. 
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While a wargame by its nature is not a precise quantitative tool, an analysis of the 
reasons for the observed results can be of great assistance in developing insights and 
reaching judgments. Since the methodology provides a direct connection between the 
specific characteristics of the external infonnation being provided and the dynamics and 
urgency of decision making in a contingency operation, it is a sensitive probe for 
answering such questions as the following: 
a) What frequency of infonnation is needed for offensive as compared to defensive 
operations? 
b) What type of infonnation has the most influence on the decisions and outcomes 
of the resulting engagements? 
c) How much difference does precision oflocation make? 
d) What fonns of enemy interference are the most damaging to the usefulness and 
acceptance by the commanders of the external infonnation? Answers to this 
question could influence the required "EW hardness" of the collection system 
design. 
One key to answering these questions is the preparation of TRAP messages that 
accurately representthe specific collection perfonnanceof current or proposed systems, or 
the possible impact on this collection of enemy countenneasures. In the latter case, with a 
defined "countenneasures scenario" consistent with the enemy's expected level of technical 
sophistication and resources (developed with the assistance of the intelligence agencies),the 
appropriate set of TRAP messages can be written and played in the game. 
The wargame approach used here for assessing the value of infonnation can be 
applied to other military "command centers" at higher or lower levels of command, such as 
joint commands. The essential ingredients are the clear control of infonnation as the 
experimental variable and credible models for evaluating the military consequence of 
tactical decisions in real time in a dynamic scenario. 
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Appendix A 
THE SIMULATION OF STRIKE OPERATIONS 
Introduction: 
In a war game which is designed to assess the impact of information availability 
on the mission effectiveness of a carrier battle group (CVBG), it is obviously important 
to leave all significant decisions in the hands of the players and equally important to 
simulate with adequate realism, events leading up to and resulting from those decisions. 
A strike operations model has been developed by Rolands Associates that the players can 
use to plan strike operations but that can also be used for the evaluation of strike results. 
In developing a strike operations model, extensive use has been made of a 
simulation called "THOR", designed by the Studies, Analyses and Gaming Section of the 
Plans and Policy Division, Headquarters U. S. Pacific Fleetl. The algorithms in THOR 
embody the tactical doctrine on the employment of CVBG assets which is used in Pacific 
Fleet studies. The data bases in THOR are structured to allow parameters describing 
friendly and enemy force capabilities to be easily changed in response to changing 
scenarios. The THOR algorithms used to assign assets to the missions being simulated 
and to evaluate the outcomes of strikes, as well as the data base structures, have been 
retained in the strike operations model incorporated in GRASS. 
However, THOR is a closed simulation, which "plans" and executes the next 
strike on the basis of perfect information on target status and defenses. After a strike, it 
updates the defense and target data, on the basis of the results of the simulation. of the 
strike. Since "ground truth" is used in strike planning as well as assessment of results, 
"THOR" had to be modified so that strike planning by the players would be based on 
their intelligence picture of enemy targets and defenses rather than ground truth, whereas 
the assessment of the outcome of the strike would be based on ground truth. In addition, 
for use in a game covering only one to three days of carrier operations it was both 
feasible and economical to simplify the treatment of logistical constraints in THOR 
which was designed for the simulation of more extended air campaigns. 
1see the report"THOR 6.0, A STRIKE CAMPAIGN MODEL", November 1991, by Dr. Robert L.Hubbard of the 
Ketron Division, Bionetics Corporation (now of Rolands Associates Inc.) for the Studies, Analyses and Gaming 
Section, Plans and Policy Division (Code 64), Commander-in-ChiefU. S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 96860-
7000. 
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The Data Bases on Targets and Associated Air Defenses: 
The scenario determines the target list that will be used in the game. Each target is 
characterized by a number of aimpoints, with single-sortie kill probabilities listed for a 
large number of weapon-aircraft combinations applied to each aimpoint. There are also 
listings of air defense assets that protect the aimpoints, along with parameters that 
characterize the performance of the defense elements. These data are used in determining 
the numbers of aircraft, by type and role, in the strike and in assessing the results. In both 
the original version of THOR and the strike operations model in GRASS, all of the 
parameters are easy to change to reflect the performance of new or hypothetical systems .. 
As in THOR, the war game modeling of strike operations requires that all targets 
that might be selected for strike by the players be listed in the initial data base. This data 
base is used to assess the results of the strikes ordered in the course of play. However, in 
the fundamental departure from the THOR design, a totally separate target and defense 
data base is used by the players to plan the strikes. 
At the beginning of play, the second data base would typically contain much of 
what is in the first but with some omissions and some misinformation. As the game 
progresses mobile targets (both offensive and defensive systems) will move to new 
locations. These changes in the situation will be reflected in the assessment data base as 
they occur. Changes in the planning data base will be made only when the players initiate 
them based on their interpretation of incoming intelligence from either external sources 
or organic assets. Post-strike reporting is handled in the same ways. 
Computer Support to Strike Planning: 
The players may decide to attack targets which are a threat to the CVBG itself and 
will attack those directed by higher authority within the limits of the battle group's 
capability. In any case, the computer provides a strike-planning decison aid. When the 
players indicate an interest in including specific targets in a strike, the computer steps 
through a sequential process in which it recommends the number of fighter-escorts to be 
sent to protect the attack aircraft from interceptors, the number of jammers to be sent to 
reduce the effectiveness of SAM batteries, the number of SAM-suppression (Iron Hand) 
aircraft to be sent to attack defenses with anti-radiation missiles, and the numbers of 
attack aircraft to be assigned to each aimpoint in the selected targets to achieve a desired 
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combined probability of "kill". In the closed simulation of THOR, if there are not enough 
available sorties of appropriate aircraft types to equal the pre-set minimums (which are 
based on "ground truth") the proposed strike is dropped. In the game, the players do not 
have to accept the computer-generated recommendations (which are based on data 
reflecting the players' interpretation of available information) and can launch the strike 
with smaller (or larger) numbers of aircraft. 
In the game the criteria used in setting the recommended numbers of aircraft for 
each role include the following: 
FIGHTER ESCORTS: The recommended number of fighter escorts is 
determined by the sum of enemy fighters on bases within a specified region 
around the intended targets, as shown by the air order of battle maintained by the 
players; multiplied by a fraction representing the portion that might be available 
and assigned to the defense and then applying a desired ratio of escort fighters to 
interceptors. 
JAMMERS: The computer counts the number of SAM sites (in the players' 
perceived intelligence display) that provide coverage of the selected targets, and 
multiplies the number of sites by a pre-set factor to obtain the recommended 
number of jammers to be sent. 
IRON HAND: A similar procedure is used for determining the desired number of 
Iron Hand aircraft. 
ATTACKERS: A desired probability of aimpoint-kill is established before 
the game. This is the probability that the delivered ordnance will kill the aimpoint 
and depends on the weapon, aimpoint hardness and delivery accuracy. In the 
model, aborts of sorties and attrition en route are accounted for by adding an 
increment to the desired probability of kill. Given the desired probability of kill 
for each target, as specified by the players, the computer searches for the available 
aircraft-weapon combination that reaches that level with the fewest sorties (a 
given sortie can attack only one aimpoint). The required number of sorties by 
aircraft type is recommended per aimpoint and the recommendations for all the 
aimpoints are summed to give the recommendation for the strike. In addition, 
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each aimpoint suitable for attack by Tomahawk is flagged so players can choose 
the missile instead of manned aircraft, if the inventory permits. 
While the software will not permit the execution of a strike when more than the available 
number of aircraft of any type are assigned, it will allow strikes with fewer than the 
recommended numbers of sorties when exigencies require. 
Strike Execution: 
At the game time at which the strike launch is ordered, after a delay that is a data 
item, the package is assumed to have assembled in the air. During the launch, aborts are 
assessed with the rate also being a data item. Further aborts are assessed en route to the 
target areas. On arrival in the target area, the first action is the air-to-air engagement 
between defending interceptors and strike-escort fighters. The engagement is broken 
down into individual "dogfights", the results of which are assessed and then summed to 
yield the aircraft losses on both sides. Strike aircraft are subject to attrition by 
interceptors; surface-to-air missiles (SAM), operating in the face of jamming and Iron 
Hand attacks; followed by anti-aircraft artillery fire. 
Dogfights: The results of dogfights are assessed using engagement rules for 
sequential air-to-air engagements and data parameters assigning relative kill 
probabilities for these engagements. If there are more interceptors than can be 
engaged by the escort aircraft, the unengaged interceptors disrupt the strike by 
attacking randomly chosen jammer, Iron Hand, or attack aircraft. 
Thus, the major impact of a serious underestimation of the number of interceptors 
to be encountered can be felt in two ways: the unengaged interceptors can kill attack 
aircraft directly or can reduce the jamming and Iron Hand efforts so that SAMs kill more 
of the attackers. 
SAM Engagements: Jammer and Iron Hand aircraft in the strike can operate 
either alone or in combination to reduce the effectiveness of the SAM defenses 
according to the following rules: 
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* All aircraft in the strike fly directly from the carrier to the designated 
targets. If their route passes through the envelope of a SAM battery, a 
fixed probability of kill is applied and the survival of each attack aircraft is 
assessed. A surviving jammer assigned without Iron Hand support to that 
battery reduces the assigned probability of kill significantly. 
* A surviving Iron Hand aircraft without a jammer assigned to the battery is 
assumed to be seen on the battery's radar and the radar is shut down to 
avoid attack with anti-radiation missiles. When this occurs, a fixed 
number of attack aircraft get a "free ride" through the battery's envelope. 
The number of free rides is a data parameter. 
* When, in the preferred tactic, both jammer and Iron Hand aircraft can be 
assigned to a SAM battery (and survive interceptor attack) the battery's 
radar is assumed not to see the Iron Hand, which then attacks the battery 
with anti-radiation missiles. If the battery is assessed as being hit, it is 
knocked out of the defenses for the duration of the strike (it is fully 
restored for subsequent strikes) and all attack aircraft move through its 
envelope unscathed. If the battery is not knocked out, it retains its 
jammed effectiveness. The considerable synergism between Iron Hand 
attacks and jamming is reflected in this assessment rule. 
* The terminal defenses of anti-aircraft artillery have the last opportunity to 
engage the attack aircraft before they deliver their weapons on their 
aimpoints. Those that survive deliver their weapons with a fixed 
probability of kill. The number of aimpoints assessed as killed are 
divided by the number of aimpoints in the target; the results are reported 
as the percent of each target destroyed. 
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Appendix B 
THE EVALUATION OF AA W ENGAGEMENT OUTCOMES 
Introduction 
In the chosen scenario, the numbers of aircraft in an attack on the CVBG will be 
relatively small, say six 6 to 16. However, the variation in enemy tactics can be large, 
including the ratio of missile-carrying fighters to escorts and jammers, the choice of 
altitudes and axes of penetration and the use of feints. As a result, simulation at the plane-
on-plane level becomes a major undertaking. Fortunately, simulations using scenarios 
very similar to the one used in this game have been carried out to support tactical 
development and capability assessments (Ref. 3 ). The prior studies involved similar types 
and numbers of aircraft, and incorporated current tactical doctrine and weapon 
effectiveness estimates, as well as intelligence on enemy tactics. We have analysed the 
reported results to obtain aggregated attrition factors for use in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the AA W defense for different defense postures both airborne and in 
deck alert on the carrier. The defense posture maintained by the players will be 
influenced by the quality and timeliness of the available I& W on the development of a 
threat to the CVBG. The AA W engagement model then provides comparison of the 
outcomes resulting from different levels of available I& W. The aggragated attrition 
factors are handled in the computer as data items and are easily changed to respond to 
changes in the scenario or to the availability of new information. 
Tactical Considerations 
In the game, the enemy air attacks on the CVBG are structured to incorporate 
tactics that are considered feasible for any moderately capable air force. In the initial 
applications of the methodology, raids and feints are carried out only in the hours of 
daylight. Attack aircraft with air-to-surface missiles are assumed to fly at low altitude 
(<1000 ft.). They are supported by medium altitude escort fighters and stand-off and 
escort jammers. The start of a raid or feint is signalled to the players by stand-off 
jamming of the E2C radar. Escort fighters and jammers fly a radial course to the carrier. 
The key point in the evaluation is that, no matter how complex the total attack, it is made 
up of discrete groups of small numbers of aircraft. There will be groups of escorts at 
medium altitude and groups of attack aircraft at low altitude. The "group" is the basis for 
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the evaluation. The effectiveness of the defense will be measured by the fraction of the 
attack aircraft that succeed in penetrating and launching their missiles. 
The players can respond to jamming strobes or aircraft detections by sending 
interceptors to find and oppose the penetrators. Those sent at medium altitude are 
assumed to be preoccupied by the enemy fighters and do not interact with any low-
altitude attack aircraft. Those interceptors sent at low altitude are assumed to engage any 
penetrating attack aircraft, with one exception. If there are accompanying medium-
altitude, escort fighters covering the attack aircraft and no interceptors are assigned to 
engage them at medium altitude, the low-altitude interceptors are assumed to be engaged 
by the escort fighters and judged as unable to reach the attack aircraft. 
The enemy aircraft that survive the interceptor engagements penetrate to an 
assumed ASM launch line around the CVBG location where they launch their weapons 
and turn back. 
The Evaluation Algorithms 
Each of the groups of penetrating aircraft, following its scripted track, is 
maintained by the computer as a separate "ground truth" entity. As interceptors are 
assigned by the players to investigate jamming strobes or to intercept detected tracks, 
they are paired with the particular group of hostile aircraft that they engage. Each 
pairing is checked to see that the intercept can be completed prior to the group reaching 
the ASM launch line. If it can, it is added to a total of "engaging interceptors" for that 
group. As each group reaches the ASM launch line, the final number of "engaging 
interceptors" is read by the computer and multiplied by an "attrition factor", i.e. "kills per 
engaging interceptor". This is an estimate of the number of hostile aircraft in that group 
that are "killed". The attrition of the interceptors is also estimated. 
When the intercepted group consists of low flying attack aircraft, the number of 
them evaluated by the algorithm as surviving is multiplied by the assumed ASM-load-
per-aircraft to determine the number of ASMs successfully launched against the CVBG. 
Some leakage rate through the point defenses of the ships is then estimated to arrive at 
the number of missiles causing damage to the CVBG. The representation of this damage 
and the effect of this damage on the strike and defense capability of the CVBG are 
discussed in Appendix C. 
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Appendix C 
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE TO SURF ACE UNITS OF THE CVBG 
Introduction 
The damage resulting from the ASMs which penetrate the ship point defenses is 
assessed in two steps. The first step is to divide the missile "hits" among the battle 
group's surface units. The second step is to assess an operational degradation resulting 
from each hit. All of the assessment parameters to be discussed are drawn from Navy 
sources and are handled as data items which are easily changed to adapt to differing 
scenarios and ship vulnerability estimates. 
The Assessment of Damage to AA W -capable Escort Ships 
Because of their greater numbers, forward deployment and defensive functions, 
the AA W -capable surface escorts are deemed to receive more than one-half the hits. Each 
successive hit on a given escort vessel produces an increasing percentage reduction in 
residual air defense capability. The overall AA W impact of a given raid on the CVBG is 
evaluated in the following steps: 
1. The number of ASMs surviving to impact is multiplied by the assumed 
fraction directed to AA W ships to obtain the number of .hits on AA W vessels. 
2.Each hit is allocated to individual escorts in turn, until each has received one hit 
and the allocation of second hits begins. 
3. The loss in point defense capability for each ship is estimated based on the 
number of hits received. 
4. The initial contribution of each escort is reduced in step 3. and the reduced 
contributions are summed to give the new, lower overall percentage of kill of 
incoming missiles. 
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Assessment of Damage to the Carrier 
The fraction of ASMs surviving-to-impact that are assigned to the carrier 
currently reduce the residual aircraft inventory on the carrier by a percentage that 
increases with each succeeding hit. Each aircraft type is reduced in the same proportion. 
This algorithm, however, is in the process of modification to also reduce the aircraft 
launching rate of the carrier, in addition to the numbers of aircraft available for launch. 
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